Arbitration was once hailed as the cure to India’s chronic judicial delays—a faster, more efficient way of resolving commercial disputes without drowning in litigation. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law, was meant to enshrine three core principles:

• Minimal judicial interference
• Maximum party autonomy
• Speedy resolution of disputes

Nearly three decades later, the dream has dimmed. Instead of becoming a true alternative to litigation, arbitration in India has often become an extension of the courtroom drama, plagued by procedural battles and judicial second-guessing.

The Referral Roadblock

The process begins with Section 8: if there’s a valid arbitration agreement, courts must send the parties to arbitration. The Supreme Court has called this a mandatory duty, yet in reality Section 8 has become the first battlefield.

• Parties routinely dispute the very existence or validity of arbitration agreements.
• SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering made matters worse by treating the appointment of arbitrators (Section 11) as a judicial rather than administrative act, dragging courts into detailed inquiries.

More recently, Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading and the seven-judge bench decision in Re: Arbitration Act v. Stamp Act tried to push courts back, stressing that they should only do a prima facie check and leave substantive issues to the tribunal. But despite these clarifications, referral hearings remain bogged down in litigation tricks.

Interim Relief & Appointment Delays

Even if referral succeeds, arbitration stalls again:

• Under Section 9, parties rush to courts for interim measures, preferring their orders over tribunal orders (despite Section 17 giving tribunals the same powers).
• Under Section 11, appointment of arbitrators still takes months, even though it was meant to be an administrative process. The Supreme Court’s rulings narrowing judicial scrutiny have not cured the delays.

In practice, arbitration often cannot even begin without first fighting two or three rounds in court.

The Contempt Conundrum

Section 27(5), which allows tribunals to seek court help in contempt matters, adds another layer of dependence. The Supreme Court in Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan expanded its scope to cover almost any default during proceedings, reinforcing that tribunals cannot truly function without judicial backing.

The Constitutional Backdoors

Despite the Act’s explicit call for limited interference (Section 5), parties constantly invoke constitutional remedies:

• Article 227 supervisory powers of High Courts.
• Article 136 special leave petitions before the Supreme Court.

The DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro Express case is the most striking example: the Supreme Court, using Article 142, set aside an arbitral award of ₹8,000 crore—undermining finality and shaking investor confidence.

Endless Post-Award Litigation

Even after an award is passed, Section 34 challenges keep parties in court for years. The notorious expansion of “public policy” in ONGC v. Saw Pipes made almost every award vulnerable. Later rulings tried to narrow it, but the damage was done.

The recent Constitution Bench ruling in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies allows courts limited power to “modify” awards—well-intentioned to save valid awards from total annulment, but also a slippery slope towards deeper judicial rewriting.

A Rich Man’s Litigation

The lived reality is stark: arbitration in India is expensive, slow, and often inaccessible to ordinary litigants.

• Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia bluntly called it “rich man’s litigation.”
• Former Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar criticised its excessive reliance on retired judges and its tendency to mimic traditional court processes.
• High-profile cases like Amazon–Future Retail show how arbitration can sprawl across multiple forums, defeating its promise of efficiency.

If India truly wants to be an international arbitration hub, it cannot afford this courtroom cloning.

Reclaiming the Original Vision

The promise of arbitration—fast, private, party-driven justice—is still alive, but only just. To revive it, India must:

1. Commit to minimal judicial intervention—courts must resist the temptation to micromanage arbitration.
2. Strengthen institutional arbitration—move away from ad hoc processes that invite more court involvement.
3. Build specialised expertise—through training programs for judges, lawyers, and arbitrators.
4. Promote accessibility—so arbitration is not just a corporate privilege but a genuine alternative for all.

Unless courts embrace restraint and parties commit to efficiency, arbitration will remain what it increasingly resembles today: litigation by another name.